

# Economic Voting Appeals in Congressional Campaigns

## Online Appendix

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Although the analysis in this paper is focused on *how* campaigns discuss economic issues, not *whether* they do so, one relevant question is whether some campaigns or types of ads are more likely to raise economics than others. Of the 396,283 aired ads in the full database, 203,821 (51.4%) included economic appeals. As the table below shows, this did not vary appreciably across the key variables used in the study.

Table A-1: Percentage of aired ads raising economic issues, by candidate, aim of appeal, and office sought

	% of aired ads making economic appeal	Total N aired ads
<b>Candidate</b>		
Challenger	54.49	75,098
Incumbent	48.78	146,856
Open seat candidate	52.72	173,113
Democrat	49.75	192,289
Republican	53.03	203,674
<b>Aim of appeal</b>		
Promotes self	49.77	170,498
Contrasts with opponent	50.21	102,934
Attacks opponent	54.85	122,452
<b>Office sought</b>		
House	54.47	196,585
Senate	48.44	199,698
<b>Total</b>	<b>51.43</b>	<b>396,283</b>

Figure A-1: Distribution of ads' policy focus, by candidate status, aim of appeal, party of candidate, and office being sought




Figure A-2: Distribution of ads' time horizons, by candidate status, aim of appeal, party of candidate, and office being sought




Table A-2: Multi-level ordinal logistic regression models predicting policy focus and time horizon used to discuss economics in campaign appeals, excluding elections with no district-level economic data

	Policy focus	Time horizon
Intercept	-6.17 (2.13)**	-0.32 (1.83)
<b>Electoral context</b>		
Senate campaign	-0.48 (1.90)	1.06 (1.38)
Competitiveness of race	0.10 (1.48)	-1.53 (1.36)
Incumbent's roll call ideological extremity	-11.00 (8.74)	-11.53 (9.97)
Presidential vote for incumbent's party	-27.02 (28.27)	3.16 (25.57)
Change in median income	0.60 (0.35) <sup>†</sup>	0.67 (0.33)*
Change in unemployment rate	-0.28 (0.13)*	0.03 (0.08)
<b>Candidate</b>		
Republican	1.94 (1.50)	-1.40 (1.45)
Incumbent	4.63 (1.73)**	-1.47 (1.75)
× Incumbent's roll call ideological extremity	25.64 (11.13)**	13.00 (11.55)
× Presidential vote for incumbent's party	19.37 (29.83)	8.28 (27.98)
× Competitiveness	-1.42 (1.62)	2.99 (1.94)
× Change in median income	-0.30 (0.40)	-0.56 (0.40)
× Change in unemployment rate	0.19 (0.11) <sup>†</sup>	-0.06 (0.12)
<b>Aim of appeal</b>		
Contrasts with opponent	7.44 (2.27)**	-4.40 (2.45) <sup>†</sup>
× Incumbent's roll call ideological extremity	7.01 (11.16)	14.53 (12.94)
× Presidential vote for incumbent's party	52.19 (35.08)	-17.79 (32.07)
× Change in median income	0.16 (0.44)	0.27 (0.49)
× Change in unemployment rate	0.28 (0.19)	-0.08 (0.17)
Attacks opponent	5.56 (2.94) <sup>†</sup>	-7.21 (3.36)*
× Incumbent's roll call ideological extremity	24.40 (11.11)*	15.79 (12.37)
× Presidential vote for incumbent's party	37.08 (40.71)	54.32 (40.48)
× Change in median income	0.25 (0.66)	0.53 (0.69)
× Change in unemployment rate	-0.06 (0.29)	-0.09 (0.22)
Contrasts with opponent × Incumbent	-1.89 (4.10)	14.87 (6.21) <sup>†</sup>
× Incumbent's roll call ideological extremity	-21.37 (16.36)	-32.62 (25.68)
× Presidential vote for incumbent's party	33.68 (30.28)	-8.00 (52.86)
× Change in median income	0.31 (1.00)	-2.70 (1.11)*
× Change in unemployment rate	-0.51 (0.41)	1.23 (0.57)*
Attacks opponent × Incumbent	6.69 (4.27)	5.83 (4.48)
× Incumbent's roll call ideological extremity	-18.37 (9.95) <sup>†</sup>	-1.89 (17.17)
× Presidential vote for incumbent's party	-74.50 (39.60) <sup>†</sup>	-91.62 (50.83) <sup>†</sup>
× Change in median income	-0.85 (0.80)	-0.61 (0.83)
× Change in unemployment rate	0.36 (0.25)	-0.01 (0.26)
Threshold 1	0.74 (0.01)	0.57 (0.01)
Threshold 2	1.35 (0.01)	4.66 (0.03)
Threshold 3	2.85 (0.02)	5.42 (0.03)
N aired ads	58,098	61,220
N candidates	71	75
N elections	47	49
$\chi^2$ for covariates	81612.71***	80754.37***
(degrees of freedom)	(66)	(66)

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$

Note: Challenger to an incumbent is excluded category for candidate type; Advocacy is the excluded category for aim of appeal.  $\chi^2$  test statistic computed by comparing deviance values in null model (with no covariates) to deviance values in full models shown here.

Table A-3: First differences in probability of focusing on policy outcomes given a shift in economic conditions, simulated from model in first column of Table 3.

Given shift in median income		
Challenger	Advocacy	0.01 [-0.04, 0.11]
	Contrast	-0.06 [-0.65, 0.46]
	Attack	-0.12 [-0.86, 0.48]
Incumbent	Advocacy	-0.33 [-0.78, 0.02]
	Contrast	0.06 [-0.71, 0.77]
	Attack	-0.03 [-0.17, 0.00]
Given shift in unemployment rate		
Challenger	Advocacy	0.24 [0.01, 0.80]
	Contrast	-0.26 [-0.84, 0.01]
	Attack	0.67 [0.03, 1.00]
Incumbent	Advocacy	0.16 [-0.25, 0.60]
	Contrast	0.40 [-0.10, 1.00]
	Attack	-0.01 [-0.09, 0.04]