Partisans have become increasingly divided in their perceptions of whether the nation’s and their own situation have gotten better or worse under the incumbent administration. But these changes are almost entirely due to the most-aware voters:
Note those Independent “leaners” – folks who say they’re Independents but on follow up admit to leaning towards a party – were actually more likely to support the party’s nominee than initial partisans who identify only weakly: while 92% of
As in previous years, party served as a screen through which candidates were perceived: whether you thought Clinton was honest, or Trump even-tempered, depended significantly on your own party identity.
Updated version of Figure 3 in Abramowitz, A.I., & Webster, S. (2016). The rise of negative partisanship and the nationalization of U.S. elections in the 21st century. Electoral Studies. http://bit.ly/2qbH8jR
Question wording: I’ll read the name of a person and I’d like you to rate that person using something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the
(or put another way, few Members of Congress represent districts won by the other party’s presidential candidate)
Knowing whether someone is a Democrat or a Republican is far more predictive of whether they support government spending on healthcare than knowing if they would personally benefit…
The more people are paying attention to the news, the more they’re lining up behind their party’s elites. Support for the airstrikes increases with attention among both Democrats and Republicans. Opinions on whether Trump should have gotten authorization from Congress
Those high in factual political knowledge were more likely to vote for the candidate that matched their issue positions (e.g., 78% of low-information voters who opposed Obamacare voted for Trump, compared to 89% of high-information voters who opposed Obamacare). Smallest
What people know about politics matters… more politically-informed people were more likely to vote, to be “very” interested in the campaign, and to “always” pay attention to politics than less politically-informed people.
Not a huge surprise, but still: the more news media sources a respondent said they consumed, the more likely they were to know which party held the majority in both the U.S. House and the U.S. Senate.
57% of all the campaign events were in just four states (FL, NC, OH, and PA); the top ten most-visited states accounted for 88% of all events.
While data like in Figure 1 tend to get read as a life-cycle effect (“the older you get, the more conservative you get”), it seems more likely that it’s a generation effect (as in Figure 2: the views you’re socialized
Different survey modes and different respondents, but the electorate does *not* seem to have perceived Clinton or Trump as much different ideologically speaking from their party’s previous nomineees.
The leaners – those who say they’re Independents but then say they “lean” towards a party – again turned out to be more reliable partisans than those who said they were Democrats/Republicans but only had a weak identity. See more
Guesses about the amount of money spent on defense in 1989 (correct answer=26%) were all over the place. Don’t know of any more recent survey questions like this but I’d love to see it replicated.
Confirmation of a long-term finding here: many Americans’ perceptions of where their tax money goes don’t match reality. 70% of respondents chose a category other than foreign aid as being the least costly. In reality, foreign aid makes up a tiny
The post-Brown v. Board make up of public schools looks… the same as it ever was. Most Black and Latino students go to schools that are majority-minority.
“It calculates the ratio of percent of all homicides in a given offender– victim race category to the percentage of execution-related homicides for that same category. If an equal percentage of homicides led to execution, the ratio would be 1.00.
Relatively advantaged individuals are more likely to join membership associations. LGBT Americans who were higher in socio-economic status (SES), who were cisgender, and who were white were all more likely to say they had been a member of an LGBT organization in
Americans who knew the name of their Member of Congress were more likely to vote for the incumbent (79.7% of them did so) than those who did not know his/her name (68.6%). These data can’t show causality, but they suggest
As Zaller (1992) would expect, polarization on same-sex marriage increases with political awareness. The more politically aware that respondents are, the more they exposed to arguments from (polarized) elites about the issue, and the more likely they are to line
As Zaller (1992) would expect, polarization on beliefs about Obamacare including “death panels” increases with political awareness. The more politically aware that respondents are, the more they exposed to arguments from (polarized) elites about the issue, and the more likely they are
As Zaller (1992) would expect, polarization on beliefs about climate change increases with political awareness. The more politically aware that respondents are, the more they exposed to arguments from (polarized) elites about the issue, and the more likely they are to
In 1960, all fifty states outlawed sodomy. Although states began repealing those laws in the 1970s, either through wholescale penal code reform or through court challenges, the Supreme Court denied that sodomy bans were unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution in